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Abstract
Recently the explicit applicability of bound entanglement in quantum cryptography
has been shown. In this paper some of recent results respecting this topic are reviewed.
In particular relevant notions and definitions are reminded. The new construction of
bound entangled states containing secure correlations is presented. It provides low
dimensional 6⊗ 6 bound entangled states with nonzero distillable key.
1 Introduction
The explicit application of quantum entanglement in quantum information theory
was the cryptographic protocol by Ekert [1]. The essential point of the protocol (cf.
further modification [2]) was the entanglement monogamy principle (see [3]) which
says that if the two particles are maximally entangled with each other then they are
completely unentangled with any other (third) party. Hence, results of any correlation
measurements on both particles must be completely safe from cryptographic point of
view, as they are uncorrelated form results of any other measurement performed on
the rest of the world. This point was further exploited in a nice application [4] of
entanglement distillation [5] (cf. [6]). The idea of Ref. [4] is called quantum privacy
amplification (QPA). Given stationary source of pure states |ΨABE〉 describing Alice,
Bob (which are cooperating) and Eve (eavesdropper) quantum correlations protocol
QPA is focused on distilling maximally entangled states
|Ψ(d)+ 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|i〉 ⊗ |i〉 (1.1)
from quantum entangled states
̺AB = TrE |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |. (1.2)
The distillation protocol uses local operations and classical communication (LOCC)
which in presence of Eve are usually called local operations and public communication
(LOPC). Once Alice and Bob distill maximally correlated states |Ψ(d)+ 〉 by entangle-
ment monogamy they share log d bits of classical secure bits. This can be done by
performing local measurements on the state (1.1) in standard bases {|i〉A}d−1i=0 and
{|i〉B}d−1i=0 .
However, since 1998 it has been known that there is quantum entanglement called
bound entanglement that can not be distilled to a pure form [7]. For a long time there
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was a common belief that distillation of secure key from quantum state is possible
only when QPA is. In other words, that bound entanglement is useless for quantum
cryptography. In fact the results of extensive analysis of two qubit case [8] naturally
suggested equivalence of entanglement distillation protocols and secure key distillation.
Surprisingly it is not true, as it has been shown in papers [9, 10]. Before we shall
recall main observations of the latter, let us point out the key ingredient of their
reasoning. Namely, why QPA might be not necessary for distilling secure key? In
fact, if Alice and Bob share maximally entangled state (1.1) they in a sense have
much stronger security than they need. In fact they will get secure correlations if
they measure the state in any pair of bases of the form: {|e(A)i 〉 = U |i〉A}d−1i=0 and
{|e(B)i 〉 = U∗|i〉B}d−1i=0 , where U stands for arbitrary unitary operation. It is crucial to
understand that in quantum cryptography it would be enough to have a single basis,
measurement in which could give secure correlations. To be more specific, the security
requirement is to get (via local measurement of Alice and Bob in one basis) the state
that is product with Eve’s degrees of freedom.
This leads us to the notion of ccq state [12], i.e., tripartite state of Alice, Bob
and Eve that is, after local von Neumann measurements, classical on Alice and Bob
parts and quantum on Eve part. With this notion one can summarize the idea of
[9, 10] as follows: Alice and Bob should proceed to distill such a state γ
(2)
ABA′B′ that,
after considering its purification |ΨABA′B′E〉 and performing a local measurements in
a standard product basis on its AB part the resulting ccq state ̺ABE is (i) product
with respect to the division AB|E (ii) contains maximal classical correlations between
Alice and Bob.
In this work we shall briefly describe main mathematical elements of the construc-
tion [9, 10], recall the idea of one-way distillation provided in [11] and provide a new
construction of bound entangled states with secure quantum key.
2 Main notions of general secure key distillation
scheme
Here we shall remind and discuss main ideas and notions introduced in Refs. [9, 10].
Assume that Alice and Bob wish to communicate but without participation of an
eavesdropper Eve. To this aim, as a source of quantum correlations, they use a quan-
tum state ̺ABA′B′ . Here, subsystem AA
′ (BB′) belongs to Alice (Bob). Moreover,
following [9], subsystem AB (A′B′) is called the key part (shield part) of the given
state. To make the considerations more formal, each subsystem of ̺ABA′B′ shall be
represented by respective Hilbert space, i.e., Alice’s subsystems by HA and HA′ and
Bob’s by HB and HB′ . Hence, the key part of ̺ABA′B′ is defined on H = HA⊗HB
and the shield part on H ′ = HA′ ⊗ HB′ . Hereafter we shall be assuming that
dimHA = dimHB = d, dimHA′ = dA′ , and dimHB′ = dB′ .
Firstly, let us remind the notion of ccq state. To this aim let us introduce a product
basis defined on Hilbert space HA ⊗HB ∼ Cd ⊗ Cd, i.e.,
BAB =
{
|e(A)i 〉 ⊗ |e(B)j 〉
}
i,j=0,...,d−1
, (2.3)
where {|e(A)i 〉}i=0,...,d−1 and {|e(B)i 〉}i=0,...,d−1 are arbitrary bases spanning the
Hilbert spaces, respectively, HA and HB . Of course, these bases may be chosen to
be standard and therefore BAB is the standard basis in C
d ⊗ Cd. Then we have the
following
Definition 1. (ccq state) We call the state ˜̺ABE a ccq state of initial state
̺ABA′B′ with respect to the basis BAB if ˜̺ABE is a result of measurement of
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̺ABE = TrA′B′ |ΨABA′B′E〉〈ΨABA′B′E | in the product basis BAB. Here |ΨABA′B′E〉
is a purification of ̺ABA′B′ .
As an illustrative example let us consider a density matrix ηABA′B′ acting on
(C2)⊗4 and given by ηABA′B′ = p|0111〉〈0111| + (1 − p)|1000〉〈1000|. As one may
easily verify its standard purification takes the form |ΨABA′B′E〉 = √p|01110〉 +√
1− p|10001〉. Therefore, the ccq state of ηABA′B′ with respect to standard basis
B
(st)
AB ≡ {|i〉A|j〉B}1i,j=0 is η˜ABE = p|010〉〈010|+ (1 − p)|101〉〈101|.
Now, one can ask when a given state is said to be secure. As an answer one gives
the following (see [10])
Definition 2. (security) We call the state ̺ABA′B′ secure with respect to the basis
BAB if its ccq state is of the form
˜̺ABE =

 d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |e(A)i e(B)j 〉〈e(A)i e(B)j |

⊗ ̺E . (2.4)
The security of such a state follows from the fact that Eve is completely uncorrelated
from distribution represented by AB system after Alice and Bob measurement. Note
that if the distribution pij is homogenous, i.e., pij = 1/d; (i, j = 0, . . . , d− 1), then we
say that ̺ABA′B′ has a BAB-key.
A very important ingredient of construction discussed here is a special class of
controlled unitary operations (see [9, 10]) that we recall by the following
Definition 3. (twisting) Let U
(A′B′)
ij be certain unitary operations acting on subsystem
A′B′. For a given basis BAB we call the operation
U =
d−1∑
i,j=0
|e(A)i e(B)j 〉〈e(A)i e(B)j | ⊗ U(A
′B′)
ij (2.5)
BAB-twisting or shortly, twisting.
The importance of such a class of operations follows from the fact that applied to
a given state ̺ABA′B′ , U do not change its ccq state. It means that if we take ̺ABA′B′
and σABA′B′ = U̺ABA′B′U
†, their ccq states are exactly the same, i.e., ˜̺ABE = σ˜ABE .
Now we define the central notion of the generalised approach provided in [9, 10].
This is the notion of private state that has log d bits of secure key encoded in its AB
part of d⊗ d type).
Definition 4. (pdit) Let ̺ABA′B′ is a density operator acting on the Hilbert space
H ⊗H ′ and ̺A′B′ is a density matrix acting on H ′. Let U(A
′B′)
i (i = 0, . . . , d− 1)
be certain unitary operations acting on A′B′ system. Then we call the state ̺ABA′B′
private state or pdit with respect to the basis BAB if it is of the form
̺ABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|e(A)i e(B)i 〉〈e(A)j e(B)j | ⊗ U(A
′B′)
i ̺A′B′U
(A′B′)†
j . (2.6)
Hereafter, as usual, we shall denote the private dits by γ
(d)
ABA′B′ . In the case when the
dimension of the key part is d = 2 on each side, we have to do with private bit or
pbit.
Now it is important to pose the question: What is the essential feature that allows
private bit to be truly private? Namely, a detailed analysis shows [9, 10] that ccq state
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of private bit γ
(d)
ABA′B′ is the same as the ccq state of the following state (called basic
pdit)
P(d)+ ⊗ σA′B′ , (2.7)
where σA′B′ = TrABγ
(d)
ABA′B′ and P(d)+ is a projector onto |Ψ(d)+ 〉. This is because it is
always possible for a given pbit to find such a twisting under which γ
(2)
ABA′B′ transforms
it to (2.7) and conversely. Thus, after performing measurement in the basis BAB the
physical system ABE is in the same state irrespective of whether before Alice and
Bob state was (2.7) or just a pdit γ
(d)
ABA′B′ . Hence the security with respect to the
measurement in that particular basis is the same as if Alice and Bob really shared
maximal entangled state P(d)+ ! This is the key observation for understanding the
essence of private dit.
We conclude the preliminary section racalling the definition of distillable key
[9, 10] and related theorem.
Definition 5. (distillable key) Let σAB be a density matrix acting on C
dA ⊗CdB and
let Pn be a sequence of LOCC operations such that Pn(σ
⊗n
AB) = Σn , where Σn is
defined on Cdn ⊗ Cdn ⊗ HA′ ⊗ HB′ . The set P = {Pn}∞n=1 is said to be a pdit
distillation protocol of a given state σAB if the following relation
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣Σn − γ(dn)ABA′B′∣∣∣∣∣∣
Tr
= 0. (2.8)
The rate of this protocol is defined as
R(P) = lim sup
n,dn→∞
log dn
n
(2.9)
and distillable key of σAB as
KD(σAB) = sup
P
R(P). (2.10)
There is a problem however, since the above definition has a complicated form.
It is hard to see whether given state fulfills the above condition or not. Fortunately,
one can simplify the task providing necessary and sufficient conditions for nonzero
distillable key that are more operational then the definition itself. Here we provide
a summary of the conditions proven in [9, 10], which are enough to analyse crypto-
graphic usefulness of many quantum states:
Theorem 1. The following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) finite number of copies of state ̺ABA′B′ can be transformed with some LOCC
protocol into the state σABA′B′ arbitrarily close in the trace norm to certain pbit
γ
(2)
ABA′B′
(ii) finite number of copies of state ̺ABA′B′ can be transformed with some LOCC
protocol into the state σABA′B′ with trace norm of the element A
(A′B′)
00,11 arbitrarily close
to 1/2, where the element is defined by the representation:
̺ABA′B′ =
1∑
i,j,k,l=0
|e(A)i e(B)j 〉〈e(A)k e(B)l | ⊗ A(A
′B′)
ij,kl . (2.11)
(iii) the state ̺ has nonzero distillable key, i.e., one has KD(̺) > 0.
Moreover any convergence of ||A(A′B′)00,11 ||Tr to 1/2 from (ii) during a given protocol
is equivalent to a convergence of the state to a certain pbit during that protocol.
Especially the condition (ii) serves as a useful criterion which allows to adjudge
an applicability of a given state to quantum cryptography. In next section we shall
illustrate its power.
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3 New class of bound entangled states with secure
quantum key
In this section we present the main result. We provide a construction of a state that
is useful for quantum cryptography simultaneously being bound entangled. Note that
the construction, however based on that presented in [11], is different in details from
known so far [9, 10, 11] and sheds some light on the still unexplored domain of bound
entanglement. Hereafter it is assumed that d = 2, i.e., the key part of ̺ABA′B′ consists
of qubits and that dimHA′ = dimHB′ = D, which allows us to write H
′ = CD⊗CD.
We may also assume for simplicity that BAB is standard basis in C
2 ⊗ C2.
3.1 The construction
To obtain a better insight into the construction we begin our considerations from an
illustrative example with the shield part of dimension D = 3 on each side. This with
the assumption that d = 2 makes the considered state to be of dimension 6 in each
side. Finally, we show that the construction is possible for arbitrary D ≥ 3.
3.1.1 The 6⊗ 6 case
At the very beginning suppose that Alice and Bob possess the following state (cf. [11])
̺ABA′B′ =
11
40


|X3| 0 0 X3
0
∣∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣∣TB′ 0 0
0 0
∣∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣∣TB′ 0
X3 0 0 |X3|

 (3.12)
where the superscript TB′ denotes the partial transposition with respect to the system
B′ and X3 is a symmetric 9× 9 matrix of the form
X3 =
1
11


−1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1


. (3.13)
which is defined on the Hilbert space HA′ ⊗ HB′ = C3 ⊗ C3 . In or-
der to show that the matrix ̺ABA′B′ is Hermitian and nonnegative, i.e.,
represents a quantum state, let us observe that X may be decomposed as
X3 = (1/11)(P(3)+ − 2P(3) + Q(3)). Here P(3)+ is a projector onto the maximally
entangled state |Ψ(3)+ 〉 = (1/
√
3)
∑2
i=0 |i〉|i〉 belonging to C3 ⊗ C3 and P(3), and Q(3)
are projectors given by relations
P(3) =
2∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| − P(3)+ , Q(3) = I9 −
2∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|, (3.14)
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where I9 stands for an identity acting on the Hilbert space C3 ⊗ C3. These above
projectors are orthogonal and therefore one obtains
|X3| = 1
11
[
P(3)+ + 2P(3) +Q(3)
]
=
1
11


5
3 0 0 0 − 13 0 0 0 − 13
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
− 13 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 − 13
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
− 13 0 0 0 − 13 0 0 0 53


.
(3.15)
From the above equation one infers two facts, first that the trace norm1 of X3 is
||X3||Tr = 1 and the second that |X3|TB′ ≥ 0. Moreover, the matrix X3 partially
transposed with respect to the subsystem B′ may be written in the form X
TB′
3 =
(1/11)
[
2S(3) − (I9 −Q(3))], where S(3) is a projector given by
S(3) = 1
2
[
I9 + V(3) − 2
2∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|
]
(3.16)
with V(3) being the swap operator defined by relation V(3)|ϕ1〉|ϕ2〉 = |ϕ2〉|ϕ1〉 for
|ϕi〉 ∈ C3 (i = 1, 2). Note that I9 − Q(3) and S(3) are orthogonal projectors and
therefore
∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣ = (1/11)[2S(3)+I9−Q(3)]. Since ∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣TB′ = (1/11)[3P(3)+ +Q(3)],
one may easily conclude that
∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣TB′ ≥ 0. This with the aid of the fact that the
matrix X3 is symmetric and real, ensures that ̺ABA′B′ represents a quantum state.
Now we are in position to prove that ̺ABA′B′ satisfies PPT (positive partial trans-
pose) criterion [13, 14]. To this aim we show that transposition with respect to subsys-
tem BB′ preserves the positivity. Indeed, the state ̺ABA′B′ transposed with respect
to the BB′ subsystem, remains a positive operator. To see this fact explicitly, we
write
̺
TBB′
ABA′B′ =
11
40


|X3|TB′ 0 0 0
0
∣∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣∣ XTB′3 0
0 X
T
B′
3
∣∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣∣ 0
0 0 0 |X3|TB′

 . (3.17)
Positivity of the above operator stems from two facts. As previously mentioned
|X3|TB′ ≥ 0 and on the other hand the off-diagonal elements are blocked by
∣∣XTB′3 ∣∣.
3.1.2 Construction of general 2D ⊗ 2D case
Trying to generalize the above investigations we start from the symmetric matrix
XD =
1
D2 + 2D − 4
[
(D − 2)P(D)+ − 2P(D) +Q(D)
]
, (3.18)
where, as previously, P(D)+ represents a projector onto maximally entangled state
|Ψ(D)+ 〉. Orthogonal projectors P(D) and Q(D) are given by
P(D) =
D−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| − P(D)+ , Q(D) = ID2 −
D−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|. (3.19)
1For an arbitrary matrix Ξ the trace norm is defined by relation ||Ξ||Tr = Tr
√
Ξ†Ξ.
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From Eq. (3.18) we have
|XD| = 1
D2 + 2D − 4
[
(D − 2)P(D)+ + 2P(D) +Q(D)
]
(3.20)
and therefore |XD|TB′ ≥ 0. Subsequently, after elementary steps, we may obtain
X
TB′
D = [1/(D
2 + 2D − 4)][2S(D) − (ID2 −Q(D))] with S(D) being defined as
S(D) = 1
2
[
ID2 + V(D) − 2
D−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|
]
, (3.21)
where V(D) is the swap operator acting on CD⊗CD. Again, the projectors ID2−Q(D)
and S(D) are orthogonal and therefore∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣ = 1D2 + 2D − 4
[
2S(D) + ID2 −Q(D)
]
. (3.22)
Finally, performing partial transposition with respect to subsystem B′, we have∣∣XTB′D ∣∣TB′ = [1/(D2 + 2D− 4)][DP(D)+ +Q(D)] and therefore ∣∣XTB′D ∣∣TB′ ≥ 0. Now we
can introduce a class of mixed states
̺
(D)
ABA′B′ =
1
4
D2 + 2D − 4
D2 +D − 2


|XD| 0 0 XD
0
∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣TB′ 0 0
0 0
∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣TB′ 0
XD 0 0 |XD|

 . (3.23)
Again, by virtue of the fact that |XD|TB′ ≥ 0 one may infer that partial transposition
with respect to subsystem BB′ preserves the positivity of ̺
(D)
ABA′B′ . In other words,
the following matrix
̺
(D)TBB′
ABA′B′ =
1
4
D2 + 2D − 4
D2 +D − 2


|XD|TB′ 0 0 0
0
∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣ XTB′D 0
0 X
T
B′
D
∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣ 0
0 0 0 |XD|TB′

 . (3.24)
possess the nonnegative eigenvalues.
3.2 Proof of nonzero distillable key KD
Since the state ̺
(D)
ABA′B′ given by Eq. (3.23) is PPT one might expect that it is
separable - it satisfies necessary (PPT) condition for separability [13]. However this is
not the case. This is in agreement with the fact [14] that PPT condition is sufficient for
separability only for the casesM⊗N ,MN ≤ 6 while here we haveMN = (2D)2 ≥ 36.
Like in [9] we shall prove nonseparability of ̺
(D)
ABA′B′ in a very nonstandard way. We
simply show that the state has nonzero KD. Such a state must be entangled since,
due to seminal result of Ref. [15], any separable state has KD = 0. Because state is
PPT and entangled it must be bound entangled [7].
To prove the cryptographic use of ̺ABA′B′ , below we show that there exist a
LOCC protocol that allows Alice and Bob to approach arbitrarily closely to some pbit
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ . Note that, obviously, since LOCC operations preserves PPT property (see
[7]), the resulting state is still bound entangled. Given k copies of the state ̺ABA′B′
in the i-th step of the protocol Alice and Bob perform the following operations:
• They take the state ̺(i−1)ABA′B′ (i = 1, . . . , k − 1) and one of remaining k − i + 1
copies of ̺ABA′B′ (here ̺
(0)
ABA′B′ = ̺ABA′B′).
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• They perform C-NOT operation treating qubits A and B of ̺ABA′B′ as source
qubits and that of ̺
(i−1)
ABA′B′ as target qubits.
• They perform a measurement of target qubits in computational basis and then
compare their results. If both of them have the same results (00 or 11) then they
keep the source state. Otherwise they get rid of it.
After performing all k steps, with some probability they arrive at the following state
̺
(D,k)
ABA′B′ =
1
ND,k


|XD|⊗k 0 0 X⊗kD
0
(∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣TB′
)⊗k
0 0
0 0
(∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣TB′
)⊗k
0
X⊗kD 0 0 |XD|⊗k


, (3.25)
where (for D ≥ 3)
ND,k = 2Tr|XD|⊗k + 2Tr
(∣∣∣XTB′D ∣∣∣TB′
)⊗k
= 2
[
1 +
(
D2
D2 + 2D − 4
)k]
k→∞−−−→ 2.
(3.26)
If we define, according to (2.11) the matrix, A
(A′B′)
00,11 (D, k) = (1/ND,k)X
⊗k
D we can
see that
∣∣∣∣A(A′B′)00,11 (D, k)∣∣∣∣Tr → 1/2 whenever k → ∞, for D ≥ 3. This means that
repeating the whole procedure described above, one may find such a k that the trace
norm of the upper right block of ̺
(D,k)
ABA′B′ is close to 1/2 with arbitrary precision.
According to the the Theorem 1 (see Section 2) this convergence guarantees that the
original state ̺
(D)
ABA′B′ defined by the formula (3.23) satisfies KD > 0. The Theorem 2
guarantees in particular, that (like it was in [9]) the above sequence of bound entangled
states ̺
(D,k)
ABA′B′ approaches private bit.
4 Summary and discussion
We have summarized main elements of general scheme of distillation of secure key
[9, 10]. The central notion of the scheme is the idea of private bit (with its natural
generalization - private dit) which is the state that, in general, consists of two parts:
the key part AB and the shield part A′B′. The first contains a bit of secure key. The
role of the second part is - in a sense - to protect the key form Eve. A surprising fact,
found in [9] is that PPT bound entangled states can approach private bit in trace
norm. Since this convergence is a necessary and sufficient condition to distill secure
key form the original state, this means that bound entangled states can serve as a
source of distillable key [9, 10].
First bound entangled states with nonzero distillable key KD were provided in
[9]. They required however very high dimensions. The small (4⊗ 4) bound entangled
states with nonzero distillable key were provided later in paper [11].
Here we have provided new class of small (of, among others, 6 ⊗ 6 type) bound
entangled states with that property. We have proven this fact applying an easy
criterion form [9] showing that a given sequence of quantum states approaches the
sequence of private bits. The LOCC protocol applied to produce such a sequence was
of two-way type. As noticed in [9] at some point the elements of the sequence got
one-way distillable key which can be distilled with help of Devetak-Winter protocol.
The original problem was that such states were of very high dimensions. Quite
surprisingly the low-dimensional bound entangled states provided in [11] represent
one-way distillable key. It was proven with help of the observation that any biased
mixture of two private bits with second of them having the key part rotated locally
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with σx Pauli matrix contains nonzero distillable key. Namely one has the following
theorem [11]:
Theorem 2. For two private bits γ
(2)
1 , γ
(2)
2 one-way distillable key of the mixture of
the form:
ρ = p1γ
(2)
1 + p2σ
(A)
x γ
(2)
2 σ
(A)
x (4.27)
with, σ
(A)
x = [σx]A ⊗ IA′BB′ satisfies K→D (ρ) ≥ 1− h(p1) with binary entropy h(p1)2.
Here K→D (ρ) stands for cryptographic key distillable from ρ with help of forward clas-
sical communication. The natural question is whether one can modify the 6⊗6 bound
entangled states provided in the present paper to get mixture of two private bits of the
above form. Our first analysis has shown that most probably it is impossible to turn
our example into a state of the form (4.27) while keeping bound entanglement prop-
erty. In Ref. [11] the construction leading to bound entangled state of the form (4.27)
was based on some properties of states that were used in locking entanglement mea-
sures effects. May be that was the reason why the construction was successful there.
Still there is a natural question about other methods to construct low-dimensional
bound entangled states with one-way distillable key.
Of course the most important open problem is whether any entangled bipartite
state contains nonzero distillable key or not. In multipartite case it is not true - there
are states that are entangled but no secure key between any of the parties can be
distilled [16]. In bipartite case lack of such states is guaranteed (via entanglement
distillation approach [4]) only for 2 ⊗ 2 and 2 ⊗ 3 cases, since, as shown in [17, 18],
all the entangled states can be distilled to singlet form in those cases. For d⊗ d with
d ≥ 4 it is known that at least some bound entangled (i.e. nondistillable to singlets)
states have nonzero distillable key [11]. No example of 3⊗ 3 or 2⊗ 4 states with that
property is still known.
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